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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Jesse David

Rebo appeals from

Statement

On appeal, Rebo

Of The

The

state

Facts

his conditional

resisting

and

challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

And Course Of The Proceedings

charged Rebo With misdemeanor domestic assault following a domestic dispute

between Rebo and his wife
arraignment.

judgment 0f conviction entered upon

methamphetamine, Violating a no contact order, and

guilty plea to possession of

obstructing.

the

at their

(R., pp.148-49.)

Rebo pled

(R., pp.161-67.)

house.

The court imposed a n0 contact order

guilty during the

that prohibited

Rebo from

contacting his Wife and from being at her “property” 0r “residence.” (R., pp. 146-49.)

Approximately one week

after the

no contact order was imposed, an ofﬁcer who had

responded t0 the domestic Violence incident just a few days prior was 0n routine patrol near the
Rebos’s house.

(R., p.24; Tr.

Prelim, p.5, Ls.5-1

1;

p.1

1,

Ls.2-10.

1)

behind the house with his wife in Violation of the n0 contact order.

— p.6,
still

L.1

1.)

The ofﬁcer saw Rebo standing
(R., p.24; Tr.

Before having any contact with Rebo, the ofﬁcer conﬁrmed the n0 contact order was

valid. (R., p.24.)

She also requested backup.

(R., p.24.)

the ofﬁcer approached Rebo, and as she approached

After three backup ofﬁcers arrived,

him she

raised her ﬂashlight and said,

“police.” (R., p.24; Tr. Prelim., p.6, Ls.21-24; p.12, Ls.1-6; p.14, Ls.22-24.)

and immediately ran
p.7, Ls.5-8.)

into the

He slammed the

p.24; Tr. Prelim., p.6, L.25

1

The

state

Prelim, p.5, L.1

house through the back door.
door closed behind him.

— p.7,

L.12.) She

Rebo saw the ofﬁcer

(R., p.24; Tr. Prelim., p.6, Ls.21-24;

(R., p.24.)

The ofﬁcer ran

after

him. (R.,

knocked 0n the back door, announced her presence,

adopts the appellant’s citation designation for the preliminary hearing transcript. This

transcript is included in the appellate record as

an exhibit.

and called Rebo’s name several times, but he did not respond.
p.7, L.4.) After standing at the

house and arrested Rebo.

(R., p.24; Tr.

Prelim, p.7, L.13 — p.8, L.2.)
ofﬁcer searched his pockets by turning them out.

L.19 — p.17, L.4.) The ofﬁcer did not ﬁnd anything in the search incident t0

p.8, Ls.3-5.) Prior t0 getting

any items 0n his person

Rebo out 0f her patrol

He

L8.)

had not found

that she

charged With additional crimes
p.16,

car, the

Prelim, p.17, Ls.5-7.) The ofﬁcer then transported Rebo to jail.

arrest. (Tr.

if

did not respond.

detention deputy searched

(Tr.

Rebo

The

state

in the search

(R., p.25; EX.1; Tr.

(Tr.

and warned him

(Tr. Prelim., p.20,

.9

Rebo

that

Prelim,
if he

had

he would be

Prelim, p.8, Ls.9-16; p.15, L.24 —

Prelim, p.8, Ls.17-19.)

again.

(R., p.25; Tr.

car at the jail, the ofﬁcer asked

something was found.

discovered a small plastic baggie that contained

ofRebo’sjeans.

Prelim, p.6, L.25 —

back door for approximately ﬁve seconds, the ofﬁcer entered the

Before placing Rebo in her patrol
(Tr. Prelim., p.16,

(R., p.24; Tr.

During the booking process, a

L.15 — p.21, L.4.)

grams of methamphetamine

The deputy

in the coin pocket

Prelim, p.8, L.20 — p.10, L.21; p.21, Ls.5-22.)

charged Rebo With possession of methamphetamine, introducing contraband into

the jail, Violating the

no contact

order,

and

resisting 0r obstructing. (R., pp.67-69.)

Rebo pled not

guilty t0 all charges. (Tr., p.5, Ls.1-23.)

Rebo then ﬁled

a motion t0 suppress. (R., pp.82-99.)

as a result of the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry into the

poisonous
rights

tree.

(R., pp.93-94.)

He

argued that

all

evidence seized

house “must be suppressed” as

fruit

of the

According to Rebo, the ofﬁcer violated his Fourth Amendment

because (1) he did not ﬂee from “a lawful arrest in a public place” before the ofﬁcer’s

warrantless entry into the house to arrest him, and (2) “the entry into [the]

was devoid 0f any exigent circumstances, other than

home by

[the ofﬁcer]

the pursuit itself.” (R., pp.86-93.)

The

state

ﬁled an objection.

(R., pp.100-06.)

The

state

argued that the ofﬁcer’s actions

were constitutional based 0n exigent circumstances because she “entered the defendant’s home
pursuit 0f a valid arrest, supported

by probable

Violation, concerned about domestic Violence

cause, after Witnessing a

No

in

Contact Order

and the defendant’s further ﬂight from capture.”

(R.,

pp.105-06.)

During the motion

to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated that they

would

evidence and testimony that had been presented during the preliminary hearing.
24.) Following the parties’ oral arguments, (Tr., p.9, L.25

Rebo had Fourth Amendment

Amendment

rights

(Tr., p.9, Ls.6-

L.19), the court asked Whether

prohibited from being at the residence

— p.19,

ﬂ

L. 10;

p.42, Ls.18-22.)

so that the parties could submit additional evidence and brieﬁng

Rebo ﬁled two supplemental

briefs in support

and Article

I,

by

the terms of the

The court continued

on this

no

the hearing

issue. (TL, p.22, Ls.

of his motion to suppress.

133-39.) In the ﬁrst, he argued that he had standing “because the Fourth

States Constitution

on the

standing to assert that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth

when he was

contact order. (T12, p.17, L.16

— p.16,

rely

1

-25.)

(R., pp.1 12-14,

Amendment of the United

Section 17 0f the Idaho Constitution protect physical entry of a

person’s home.” (R., pp.1 12-13.) In the second, he argued that he had a reasonable expectation

0f privacy in the home because he had a “proprietary interest” in the house.
also argued that he

guest

who

wrongfully overstayed their checkout.

The
pp. 128-3

had a legitimate expectation ofprivacy

1 .)

state also

The

state

to suppress should

ﬁled an addendum t0

its

(R.,

in the

home analogous

(R., p.130.)

to that

He

of a hotel

pp.135-36, 137-38.)

brief in opposition of the motion to suppress. (R.,

argued that Rebo “he had no standing to bring

be denied.”

(R., pp.135-37.)

[the]

motion and the motion

Speciﬁcally, the state contended that

Rebo did not

have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house he was arrested in because he had been court
ordered not t0 go t0 0r remain Within 300 feet of the residence. (R., pp. 128-3 1 .)

During a subsequent
order, (TL, p.50, Ls.1-9;

law related

t0

ﬂ

pretrial conference, the court

R., pp.141-69),

Rebo’s motion

and orally issued ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of

house

.

The court determined
.

.

after the

at the

residence Where he

issued,

Ls.15-18.) Accordingly, the court concluded that

by

Rebo did not “have

the police ofﬁcers” because he

The court denied

was

arrested.

that the

(TL, p.57,

and he had notice of that order.”

in the

(Tr., p.59,

standing t0 complain about

had not “carried

existence of a legitimate expectation 0f privacy in the house Where he

Ls.18—23.)

The court found

1).

Rebo did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy

that

no contact order had been

the warrantless entry

L.17 — p.60, L.1

t0 suppress, (Tr., p.49,

no contact order prohibited Rebo from being
Ls.6-9.)

took judicial notice 0f the n0 contact

his

was

burden

to

arrested.”

the motion to suppress. (R., pp.180-81; Tr., p.60, Ls.9-1

prove the
(Tn, p.59,

1.)

Pursuant t0 a plea agreement, Rebo entered conditional guilty pleas t0 possession of

methamphetamine, Violating the n0 contact order, and
176; TL, p.68, Ls.2-24.)

the

jail.

motion

(R.,

pp.174-78;

t0 suppress.

The

state

Tr., p.69,

and obstructing.

(R.,

pp.171-73,

dismissed count two, introduction of methamphetamine into

Rebo reserved

Ls.14-15.)

(R., pp.171-72.)

the right t0 appeal the denial of his

The court imposed a uniﬁed ﬁve-year

years ﬁxed. (R., pp.197—201; Tr., p.90, L.25

—

p.91, L.2.)

placed Rebo on probation for a period of two years.
timely appealed. (R., pp.207-12.)

resisting

(R.,

sentence, With

The court suspended
pp.197-206;

two

the sentence and

Tr., p.91, Ls.5-7.)

Rebo

M
Rebo

states the issue

Did the

0n appeal

district court err

When

as:

it

denied Mr. Rebo’s motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Rebo

failed to

show that the

district court erred

When it denied his motion to

suppress?

ARGUMENT
Rebo Has Failed T0 Show That The

District

Court Erred

When It Denied His Motion T0

Suppress

A.

Introduction

On

appeal,

Rebo

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

Rebo

ﬁrst contends that he has Fourth

the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry into the

“even

if the court

was

When

asserts the district court erred

home. (Appellant’s

it

denied his motion t0 suppress.

Amendment

standing to challenge

According

t0

Rebo,

correct” that he lacked “a reasonable expectation 0f privacy” in the

home,

brief, pp.7-10.)

he nevertheless had Fourth Amendment standing because the ofﬁcer’s physical intrusion into the

home

violated his property-based Fourth

Amendment

rights.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.)

Rebo

next contends that the district court correctly determined that n0 exigencies justiﬁed the ofﬁcer’s
warrantless entry.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-1

failing t0 suppress the

Rebo has
First,

the

methamphetamine

failed to

show

1).

Second, even
Fourth

order,

if

he argues the

that the district court erred

When it denied the motion t0

t0 urge the suppression

Rebo had Fourth Amendment standing
it

0f the home.

was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances

the warrantless entry violated his Fourth

fruit

feet

the warrantless entry did not Violate his

necessitating immediate police action. Finally, even if Rebo has Fourth

need not be suppress as

suppress.

of evidence by Virtue of

Which prohibited him from going 0r remaining within 300

Amendment rights because

from the alleged

district court erred in

as fruit 0f the poisonous tree. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

Rebo lacked Fourth Amendment standing

n0 contact

Finally,

Amendment

rights, the

0fthe poisonous tree because

illegal police conduct,

and

its

its

Amendment

standing and

methamphetamine nevertheless

discovery was sufﬁciently attenuated

discovery was inevitable.

Of Review

Standard

B.

“The standard of review 0f a suppression motion
230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005).

When

a decision

is

biﬁlrcated.” State V. Watts, 142 Idaho

on a motion

to suppress is challenged, the

appellate court accepts the trial court’s ﬁndings of fact that are supported

by

substantial evidence,

m

but exercises free review of the application 0f constitutional principles to the facts as found.

V.

Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing,

the

power to

assess the credibility ofwitnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts,

factual inferences

is

vested in the

trial court.

weigh evidence, and draw

State V. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106,

897

P.2d 993, 997 (1995).

Rebo Lacked Fourth Amendment Standing To Urge The Suppression Of The
Methamphetamine On The Basis Of The Ofﬁcer’s Warrantless Entry Into The Home

C.

The

district court correctly

to urge the suppression

determined that Rebo did not have Fourth Amendment standing

of the methamphetamine.

standing to invoke the exclusionary rule

alleges

was

(“Fourth

E

illegally obtained.

Amendment

When

A

defendant must have Fourth

obj ecting t0 the use of evidence that the defendant

Alderman

V.

United

States,

rights are personal rights which, like

not be vicariously asserted”).

Amendment

“The concept of standing

394 U.S. 165, 171-74 (1969)

some other

in Fourth

constitutional rights,

Amendment

may

cases can be a

useful shorthand for capturing the idea” that the person urging suppression “must have a

cognizable Fourth
relief.”

Byrd

V.

Amendment interest in the place

United States,

Maxim, 165 Idaho 901,

_

U.S.

_, _,

searched” or in the item seized “before seeking

138

1518, 1530 (2018);

S. Ct.

_, 454 P.3d 543, 548 (2019); State

V.

Mann, 162 Idaho

P.3d 79, 82 n.1 (2017). However, the concept 0f Fourth Amendment standing
the merits and

_

U.S. at

‘is

ﬂ

“is

211$ State V.

36, 39 n.1,

not distinct from

more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.

_,

138

S.

Ct. at

1530 (quoting Rakas

V.

Illinois,

394

’”

Bﬂd,

495 U.S. 91, 139 (1978)).

Consequently,

when Fourth Amendment

standing

challenged search 0r seizure violated the Fourth
seeks t0 exclude the evidence obtained during

The Fourth Amendment guarantees,
in their persons, houses, papers,

Const. amend. IV.

and

at issue the

is

Amendment

it.”

Ra_lcas,

rights

495 U.S.

question

“whether the

0f a criminal defendant

who

at 140.

in relevant part, “[t]he right

effects, against

is

0f the people to be secure

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

Until “at least the latter half of the 20th century,” substantive “Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence was

common—law

tied to

trespass.”

United States

V. Jones,

565 U.S.

400, 405 (2012) (citations omitted). Thus, “[a] warrantless police entry into a private residence

presumptively Violative 0f the Fourth Amendment.” State

P.2d 426, 428
V.

New

(Ct.

App. 1996)

(citing

Welsh

V.

York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); State

V.

Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131, 922

Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984);
V. Curl,

is

Paﬂon

125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225

(1993)).

Later cases deviated from this exclusively property—based approach.

405 In
.

ﬂ,

565 U.S.

at

the court added the reasonable expectation ofprivacy test t0 “the traditional property-

based understanding 0f the Fourth Amendment.”
(citation omitted);

ﬂ

Katz

V.

Florida V. Jardines, 569 U.S.

United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

1,

11 (2013)

When applying the reasonable

expectation of privacy test to determine Whether the defendant’s Fourth
violated, the

m,

Amendment

rights

were

court ﬁrst evaluates Whether the defendant “exhibited an actual (subjective)

expectation of privacy, and second, [whether] the expectation be one that society

recognize as ‘reasonable.’”

ﬂ, 389 U.S.

at

361

(J.

Harlan concurring).

burden to demonstrate a legitimate expectation 0f privacy. Rawlings
104 (1980) (citations omitted); State

V.

Hanson, 142 Idaho 71

1,

V.

It is

is

prepared t0

the defendant’s

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,

717, 132 P.3d 468, 474 (Ct. App.

2006) (citations omitted). Application of both the traditional property-based and the more recent

privacy—based concepts of Fourth
court in this case reveals that

Amendment jurisprudence

Rebo lacked Fourth Amendment

to the facts as

found by the

district

standing t0 urge the suppression 0f

the methamphetamine.

Rebo lacked Fourth Amendment standing because he lacked an
expectation ofprivacy in the home. Applying the ﬁrst part of the
that

Rebo

test,

the district court stated

“certainly exhibited an actual subjective expectation ofprivacy” in the

ran into the

home

in order to “get

away from

However, applying the second part 0f the
that

m

objectively reasonable

test,

the police officers.”

(Tr., p.58,

home because he

L.25 — p.59, L.2.)

the court determined that allowing

Rebo

“to assert

he had an expectation of privacy” in a house “Where a court order prohibited him from being

would seem contrary

t0 the expectations that society

would recognize

as being a legitimate 0r

reasonable expectation of privacy.” (TL, p.60, Ls.1-9.) The district court

The

valid

is

correct.

n0 contact order rendered any subj ective expectation 0f privacy that Rebo had

his presence inside the

in

house obj ectively unreasonable. Society is not prepared to deem a criminal

defendant’s subj ective expectation ofprivacy in a particular location reasonable 0r legitimate

a court order proscribes their presence there and the defendant has notice 0f the order?

when

(E

Tr.,

2

In a footnote, Rebo suggests that “[i]t is far from clear that Idahoans would deem an expectation
0f privacy in one’s own home objectively unreasonable due t0 the existence 0f a court order
requiring that person t0 be elsewhere for a given period 0f time.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9 n.6.)

Rebo contends

Whenever a person is “called for jury duty,
subpoenaed t0 appear as a Witness, 0r [is] arrested and ordered held in jail,” ofﬁcers could “break
into [that person’s] home, rummage through their personal belongings, and seize whatever they
want, and the resident would have n0 standing to claim a Fourth Amendment Violation.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.9 n.6.) This argument is based 0n the false premise that no contact orders
merely require the person to be elsewhere for a given period. This is not so. Whereas summonses,
subpoenas, and orders of conﬁnement are prescriptive and merely require the person’s presence in
a location other than their home, no contact orders are prescriptive and may expressly prohibit the
person’s presence in their homes, as was the case here. Thus, Rebo would maintain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his home When complying With the requirements of a subpoena or a
summons, but when a court order expressly prohibits his physical presence inside the house, he
that if such

were the

case, then

p.59, Ls.15-18.)

In fact, “the legislature,

no contact order

Violating a

rises to the level

the level 0f felonious criminal conduct.

1203 (1985); LC.

which

is

the voice 0f the people,” has determined that

of criminal conduct and in certain cases

and

its

716 P.2d 1182,

week

prior t0 Rebo’s

§ 18-920.

plain language prohibited

him from going

Rebo was well aware of the no

residence.

the court

(Tr., p.52,

it.

imposed the no contact order Rebo and

Rebo would need

0r remaining Within 300 feet 0f his Wife’s

to live elsewhere in light

any subjective expectation 0f privacy

that

he

L23 — p.53, L.1 1.)

his attorney verbally

of the order.

(TL, p.52, L.12

Because the no contact order proscribed his presence

p. 148.)

may have had

at the

even

if the district court

in his presence inside the

was

correct in

its

Fourth Amendment.

arrest,

home was

home.

Amendment

standing

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.)

According

to

Rebo, the ofﬁcer “entered Mr.

(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

However, Rebo

is

lost

an

court—ordered not

in.
It is

state

argument is limited t0 Rebo’s Fourth Amendment
effectuate a warrantless seizure ofhis person inside the home.

also important to note that the state’s

standing t0 challenge police entry to

The

R.,

determination that he lacked a

cannot then claim a reasonable expectation 0f privacy in the location that he

be

ﬂ

0n the basis 0f traditional property-based notions of the

Rebo’s home uninvited — she trespassed.”

t0

that

suppression 0f the

arrest inside the

reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, he nevertheless has Fourth
t0 challenge the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry

p.53, L.14;

home on the day 0f his

methamphetamine 0n the basis of the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry and
that

—

Furthermore,

acknowledged

Amendment standing to urge

obj ectively unreasonable. Thus, he lacked Fourth

Rebo argues

him 0f

contact order’s terms as the court had informed

precisely What the order prohibited before he signed

When

t0

State V. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 431,

Here, the no contact order had been imposed approximately one

arrest,

may rise

does not dispute Rebo’s Fourth

Amendment

standing t0 challenge a warrantless search

and/or seizure 0f his personal property inside the home.

10

occupancy

interest in the

home once

the

n0 contact order was imposed against him, and he

acknowledged as much when the n0 contact order was ﬁrst imposed. He
place
lost

t0 live,

Ineed

an occupancy

to

in the

than those 0f someone

home by Virtue of the n0

my new

home on the day of his

Who

arrest

contact order, his property—based Fourth

were more analogous

actually resides in the home.3

rights in their rented properties, their property—based Fourth

are not equivalent t0 those 0f the tenants

m,

“For

be there by 7:00.” (TL, p.53, Ls.12-14 (emphasis added).) Because Rebo

interest in the

Amendment rights

stated,

who occupy

t0 those

of a landlord

Although landlords retain ownership

Amendment rights

E

the properties.

in those properties

Chapman

V.

United

365 U.S. 610 (1961) (holding that the landlord could not consent to a Fourth Amendment

search of his tenant’s home); State V. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986) (holding that
landlord

was Without

authority t0 give effective consent to the Fourth

tenant’s home); State V. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219,

landlord,

order

the

ﬂ

also Georgia V. Randolph,

the

home when

in the

is

in actual

home even after the no contact

no contact order prohibited him from occupying or being

home, he lacked any cognizable property-based Fourth Amendment

seizure Within the residence.

the tenant

547 U.S. 103 (2006) (discussing Chapman). Like a

Rebo may have maintained certain ownership rights

was imposed, but because

search 0f his

984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999) (“A landlord does

not have actual authority to consent to a search of a tenant’s
possession”);

Amendment

Hence, Rebo also lacked Fourth

right for purposes

Amendment

in

of his

standing 0n the basis

0f the ofﬁcer’s physical intrusion into the home.

3

memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, he
acknowledged that his Fourth Amendment rights in the home may have been more limited than
those 0f a homeowner. He compared his rights in the home t0 those of a hotel/motel guest Who
In Rebo’s second supplemental

wrongﬁllly stays past checkout.

(R., p.137.)

11

no contact order prohibited Rebo from being

In sum, a valid

arrested, therefore

Amendment

right

against his warrantless

Rebo lacked Fourth Amendment standing

to

methamphetamine 0n the basis of the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry

D.

home where he was

he lacked both an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy as well as a

property—based Fourth

Accordingly,

at the

seizure inside the

urge the
into the

suppression

home.
0f the

home.

The Ofﬁcer’s Warrantless Entry Did Not Violate The Fourth Amendment

Even

if

Rebo had standing

to challenge the warrantless entry, that entry

“Any analysis of an ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry into

exigent circumstances.

a private dwelling must

begin with the recognition that a warrantless entry into a private residence
prohibited

by

445 U.S.

at

the Fourth

586;

Amendment.”

M,

466 U.S.

was justiﬁed by

is

presumptively

Cirl, 125 Idaho at 225, 869 P.2d at 225 (citing

at 749).

The

state

may overcome

this

m,

presumption by

demonstrating that the warrantless entry “was based upon probable cause and that exigent
circumstances existed necessitating immediate police action.”

ﬂ

(emphasis in original);

(“The State
requirement.

may overcome
One such

exigencies that

felon,

I_d.

also State V. Sessions, 165 Idaho 658,

this

exception

m,

(citing

450 P.3d 306, 308-09 (2019)

presumption by proving one of the exceptions t0 the warrant
is

exigent circumstances.” (citations omitted». “The traditional

may justify a warrantless entry by law enforcement ofﬁcers

imminent

risk

445 U.S. 573)

are pursuit 0f a ﬂeeing

of destruction of evidence, prevention 0f a suspect from escaping, or danger

t0 the police or t0 other persons inside 0r outside the dwelling.” State V.

499, 163 P.3d 1208, 121

1

(Ct.

App. 2007)

Robinson, 144 Idaho 496,

(citation omitted).4 Application

4

of correct constitutional

Exigent circumstances can justify warrantless entry seizures for jailable misdemeanors. State
Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 498-501, 163 P.3d 1208, 1210-13 (Ct. App. 2007).
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V.

principles to the facts as found

the house

by the

district court reveals that the

ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry into

was based upon probable cause and exigent circumstances.

It is

undisputed that the warrantless entry in this case was supported by probable cause.

The ofﬁcer personally observed Rebo standing within 300

feet

of the protected residence and

simultaneously having contact With his wife. Before initiating any contact With Rebo, the ofﬁcer

conﬁrmed

no contact order was

that the

contact order

was

still

valid.

Given the ofﬁcer’s knowledge

valid and her observation of Rebo actively Violating

him

ofﬁcer] had probable cause t0 arrest

for

it,

that the

Rebo concedes

n0

“that [the

misdemeanor Violation 0f a n0 contact order.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)

The exigency of hot pursuit justiﬁed the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry t0
The doctrine of hot
public place,

pursuit provides that “arrests based

may be completed

0n probable cause,

in a private residence if that is

Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504

(Ct.

effectuate the arrest.

if

where the suspect ﬂees.”

App. 2009) (holding

been

set in

The

V.

Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (“[A] suspect

motion

in a public place

salient facts

had probable cause
42.

As

.

.

.

in a

that the ofﬁcers

warrantless entry to complete an arrest that had been set in motion in a public place

United States

m

commenced

was

lawful);

may not defeat an arrest Which has

by the expedient 0f escaping

to a private p1ace.”).

of this case are similar t0 those of the Santana case. In Santana, ofﬁcers

t0 believe that the suspect

had committed a crime.

m,

427 U.S.

at

39-

the ofﬁcers prepared to arrest the suspect, they observed her “standing directly in the

doorway 0f her home—one

step forward

would have put her

have put her in the vestibule 0f her residence.”

Li. at

40

n. 1.

they shouted “police,” and displayed their identiﬁcation.
retreated into her

home.

I_d.

outside,

As the ofﬁcers approached the
Li. at 40.

The ofﬁcers followed her through

13

one step backward would
suspect

The suspect immediately

the door and arrested her in the

residence.

Li.

Addressing the question of “whether her act of retreating into her house could

thwart an otherwise proper arrest,” the United States Supreme Court held that

could not. Li.

it

at

42.

Here, the court’s factual ﬁndings support the conclusion
the ofﬁcer initiated an arrest based

home

to

complete the

home and

as she approached

seeing the ofﬁcer

Rebo ran

upon probable cause outside

Like the ofﬁcers in

arrest.

him she

into the

that, like the

m,

the

home and

the ofﬁcer observed

him from having

by

home, just

into the

if

contact With Ms.

Rebo and going Within 300

like the ofﬁcers in Santana.

home

outside the

upon
t0

home was a clear attempt

his constitutional rights

after

feet

of her residence.”

Rebo and completed

(Tr., p.59,

the arrest inside

Like the defendant in Santana, Rebo cannot thwart the

home by retreating into

Rebo has Fourth Amendment standing

home,

Rebo

the “police ofﬁcers [who] were there to enforce the very order prohibiting

otherwise lawful arrest that was initiated outside the

Thus, even

only entered the

house and slammed the door closed behind him in order

Ls.12-15.) In response, the ofﬁcer ran into the

the

m,

raised her ﬂashlight and said, “Police.” Immediately

“escape the police ofﬁcers.” (TL, p.59, Ls.1 1-12.) Rebo’s retreat into the
to thwart his arrest

ofﬁcers in

the private residence.

t0 challenge the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry

were not violated because the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry

was justiﬁed by probable cause and hot pursuit.
The

district court incorrectly

concluded that exigent circumstances did not justify the

ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry into the home. (Tr., p.55, L.22

— p.57,

L.5.)

Rebo argues that the district

court correctly concluded that “there were n0 exigencies justifying Ofﬁcer Taylor’s warrantless
entry into Mr. Rebo’s

L.3

—

p.57, L.5).)

home in order t0 make the

arrest.” (Appellant’s brief,

Without addressing the exigency 0f hot

pursuit,

p.10 (citing

Rebo contends

Tr., p.55,

there

was n0

danger of ﬁthher domestic Violence between Rebo and his wife because she was outside the

14

home

with other police ofﬁcers

when Rebo ﬂed

home. (Appellant’s

into the

brief, p.1 1.)

Rebo

also

contends that “any theoretical concern about Mr. Rebo’s ﬂight could not justify entry into the

home” because

the ofﬁcers

would have “been able

t0 prevent

Mr. Rebo from leaving simply by

standing outside and making sure he did not leave.” (Li) These arguments do not

show

that the

hot pursuit exception does not justify the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry in this case.

The

risk 0f danger t0

Rebo’s Wife

and Santana, multiple ofﬁcers and
retreated into the house.

m,

house’s front steps and tried t0
retreated into her house.

Li

ofﬁcers that the defendant in

with her heroin.

The

at least

make

m

this case

was justiﬁed

solely

by hot

39-41.

Rebo posed

posed

In

m,

at least the

t0 the ofﬁcers

ofﬁcer in this case

involved in a domestic Violence incident
the danger posed t0 the third party

at

at the

a person

time the defendant

was

on the

sitting

off With envelopes 0f heroin that the suspect dropped as she

40-41.

fact that the

In both this case

not a requirement for hot pursuit.

one third party were present

427 U.S.

m

at

is

made

was justiﬁed by hot pursuit even

and the person

knew

the

to his wife

Who

tried t0

and the

make

off

Rebos had been recently been

the risk 0f danger to Rebo’s wife even greater than

by the suspect
pursuit.

same danger

Li

in

m.

Likewise, the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry in

at 43.

if there

Ultimately, the warrantless entry in

was n0

risk of danger to the ofﬁcers or to

Rebo’s

Wife.

Furthermore, the need to prevent Rebo’s further escape
pursuit.

her

is

also not a requirement for hot

In Santana, any need t0 prevent the suspect’s further escape after she had retreated into

home

did not justify the warrantless entry nor did

it

negate the hot pursuit.

EQ

at

39-43.

In both this case and Santana, multiple ofﬁcers were present at the house at the time of the

warrantless entry.

Li at 3 8-41. Thus, the ofﬁcers hypothetically could have “surrounded the house

While they awaited a

[]

warrant.” (TL, p.56, L.25

15

—

p.57, L.1;

ﬂ alﬂ

Appellant’s brief, p.1

1.)

Nevertheless, in both cases the ofﬁcers crossed the threshold 0f the

The need

0f the suspect.

entry in San_tana nor did

home

to effectuate the arrest

t0 prevent the suspect’s further escape did not justify the warrantless

it

negate the hot pursuit.

Li. at 42-43.

Likewise, any need t0 prevent

Rebo’s further escape did not negate the warrantless entry based on hot pursuit in

this case.

Accordingly, the exigency of hot pursuit independently justiﬁed the ofﬁcer’s warrantless entry in
this case.

Notwithstanding the fact that the prevention of further escape and the need to protect

Rebo’s Wife are not requirements for hot pursuit, these two exigent circumstances also justiﬁed
the warrantless entry in this case independent 0f the hot pursuit.

“The

ofﬁcers or other persons either inside 0r outside the dwelling constitutes
a warrantless entry.”

State V. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 294,

(emphasis added) (citing State
(Ct.

V.

.

.

.

of danger to police

an exigencyjustifying

62 P.3d 214, 218

(Ct.

App. 2003)

Pearson—Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 849-50, 41 P.3d 275, 277-78

App. 2001)). This exception “justiﬁes a warrantless search when the

at the

risk

facts

known t0 the police

time 0f the entry, along With reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, demonstrate a

‘compelling need for ofﬁcial action and no time t0 secure a warrant.” Li. at 293, 62 P.3d at 217
(citing

Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho

925 P.2d 1131, 1133
Whether those

facts

the action taken

facts

41 P.3d at 277; State V. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434,

App. 1996)). “Under

this objective standard, [the Court] determine[s]

and inferences would ‘Warrant a

was

Anderson, 136 Idaho

The

(Ct.

at 849,

appropriate.’”

at

m,

man of reasonable

138 Idaho

at

caution in the belief that

293, 62 P.3d at 217 (citing Pearson-

850, 41 P.3d at 278).

known

to the ofﬁcer at the time

drawn thereupon, demonstrate a compelling need

of her entry, along with reasonable inferences
for

immediate action both to prevent the risk of

additional domestic Violence and to prevent Rebo’s ﬁthher ﬂight from capture.
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The ofﬁcer knew

that

Rebo had been involved

in a domestic Violence incident with his wife at the

home just

a few

days prior and had already violated a court order not t0 have contact With the Victim. The ofﬁcer

had also observed Rebo ﬂee the scene immediately

after

he saw the ofﬁcer. Rebo ﬂed into the

house that a court order prohibited him from going to and remaining

in.

By

ﬂeeing,

committed the new crime of resisting and obstructing, and by entering and remaining

Rebo

violated the n0 contact order and thus the law.

in the

Rebo
house

Concerns about the potential for further

domestic Violence as well as Rebo’s further ﬂight from capture rendered the ofﬁcer’s split—second
decision to enter the

home and complete Rebo’s

Therefore, the warrantless entry in this case

was

arrest

both reasonable and appropriates

also justiﬁed

by

the exigencies 0f needing to

prevent Rebo’s further escape and to mitigate the potential danger to the ofﬁcers and Rebo’s wife.

The Methamphetamine Need Not Be Suppressed As

E.

The methamphetamine discovered
suppressed under the Fourth

in

Amendment even

Rebo’s pocket
if the

State V.

States,

Of The Poisonous

at

Amendment is

Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 659, 662 (2017)

371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State

The exclusionary

rule is a judicial

V.

Tree

the jail cannot properly be

ofﬁcer’s entry into the house

Generally, evidence obtained in Violation of the Fourth

rule.

Fruit

was improper.

subject t0 the exclusionary

(citing

Wong Sun V. United

Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004)).

remedy

for addressing illegal searches

Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006), and

it

and

seizures, State V.

requires the suppression

of “primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure” as well as “evidence

5

“As

the

text

makes

“reasonableness.”’”
Stuart,

Riley

clear,

‘the

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
573 U.S. 373, 381-82 (2014) (citing Brigham City

ultimate

V. California,

547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).

17

is

V.

later

V.

discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or

‘fruit

of the poisonous tree,” ﬁgu—ra

United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (citation omitted).

“However, there are various exceptions

to the exclusionary rule.”

Cohagan, 162 Idaho

720-21, 404 P.3d at 662-63 (citations omitted). “First, the independent source doctrine allows
courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawﬁll search if ofﬁcers independently acquired

a separate, independent source.” Utah V. Streiff,

Murray

(citing

doctrine»;

ﬂ

V.

_

U.S.

_, _, 136

S. Ct.

it

at

trial

from

2056, 2061 (2016)

United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (describing the independent source

211$ Stuart V. State, 136 Idaho 490, 497-99, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-87 (2001) (adopting

the independent source doctrine).

“Second, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the

admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source.”
Li. (citing

Nix

V.

ﬂ alﬂ m,
doctrine).

Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (describing the inevitable discovery doctrine»;

136 Idaho

Finally,

497-99, 36 P.3d at 1285-87 (adopting the inevitable discovery

at

under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]Vidence

between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence

some intervening circumstance,

is

so that ‘the interest protected

is

admissible

when

the connection

remote or has been interrupted by

by

the constitutional guarantee that

has been violated would not be served by suppression 0f the evidence obtained.”’ Li. (quoting

Hudson

V.

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006));

ﬂ

211$ Stuart, 136 Idaho at 497-99, 36 P.3d at

1285-87 (adopting the attenuation doctrine). The methamphetamine discovered

at the jail in this

discovery was sufﬁciently

case need not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree because

its

attenuated from any alleged police misconduct and because

would have been

it

inevitably

discovered.

The discovery of

the

methamphetamine was sufﬁciently attenuated from the alleged

unconstitutional police conduct that

it

need not be suppressed. “There are three factors for a court

18

to consider

140 Idaho
the

when determining whether unlawful conduct

at

has been adequately attenuated.”

Egg,

846, 103 P.3d at 459 (citation omitted). “The factors are: (1) the elapsed time between

misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence,

(2)

the

0f intervening

occurrence

circumstances, and (3) the ﬂagrancy and purpose 0f the improper law enforcement action.” Li.

The weight 0f these

factors here

In this case,

exactly

all

how much

weighs in favor 0f attenuation, not suppression.

three factors

weigh

in favor

of attenuation.

The record does not reveal

time elapsed between the warrantless entry and the discovery of the

methamphetamine. Nevertheless, the

district court’s

ﬁndings show that substantial time elapsed

and several intervening events occurred between the warrantless entry and the discovery 0f the

methamphetamine:

(1) the

ofﬁcer arrested Rebo in the home, (2) the ofﬁcer took him out t0 her

patrol car, (3) the ofﬁcer searched

(5) before getting

Rebo out 0f the

Rebo

incident t0 arrest, (4) the ofﬁcer transported

patrol car at the jail, the ofﬁcer asked

Only

at the jail.

after all

t0 jail,

Rebo Whether he had

anything on his person that she had not found during the search incident to
ofﬁcers initiated booking procedures

him

arrest,

and

(6) the

of these intervening events did the

detention deputy discover the methamphetamine in Rebo’s coin pocket during the administrative

search at the jail. Such a substantial passage oftime and the occurrence 0fthese intervening events

weighs heavily in favor of attenuation.

With respect
rule

is

to the third factor,

to deter police misconduct.

it is

important t0 note that the purpose 0f the exclusionary

Davis

V.

United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011).

“Accordingly, the third factor only favors exclusion ‘When the police misconduct

of deterrence—that
at

665

is,

(citing Strieff,

in this case

When

_

it

U.S.

was purposeful orﬂagrant.” Cohagan, 162 Idaho
at

_, 136

S. Ct. at

at

most

in

need

723, 404 P.3d

2062 (emphasis added)). The ofﬁcer’s conduct

was not ﬂagrant. Given her knowledge

19

is

that the

no contact order prohibited Rebo from

being in the home, she reasonably could have believed that probable cause and exigent
circumstances justiﬁed her warrantless entry.

The

district court

even acknowledged that “the

ofﬁcer took a very practical approach to the circumstances.” (TL, p.57, Ls.1-2.) Moreover, there
is

nothing suggesting the arresting ofﬁcer entered the

searching jailer

Because

all

was aware of or otherwise

three factors

suppressed as

fruit

weigh

to

conduct a drug investigation or the

exploiting any illegal entry

by

the arresting ofﬁcer.

0f attenuation, the methamphetamine need not be

in favor

of the poisonous

home

tree.

Additionally, proper application 0f the inevitable discovery doctrine also reveals that the

methamphetamine need not be suppressed.

“The

inevitable discovery doctrine applies

When

a

preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the information would have inevitably been
discovered by lawﬁJI methods.” Bu_nting, 142 Idaho
at

at

915, 136 P.3d at 386 (citing

444; State V. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 286 n.4, 108 P.3d 424, 433 n.4 (Ct. App. 2005)).

methamphetamine found

in

as the district court suggested

they awaited [an arrest] warrant.”

(TL, p.56, L.25

—

The ofﬁcers would

detention deputy

would

still

The ofﬁcers would

taint

have transported Rebo to the

jail for

booking, and the

Thus, the methamphetamine need not be suppressed because

inevitably discovered

and because

it

have

upon probable cause and exigent

by lawﬁJI means.

Because the discovery of the

methamphetamine was sufﬁciently attenuated from the alleged police misconduct so
any

still

have discovered the methamphetamine in Rebo’s coin pocket during

the administrative booking search.

would have been

still

and “surrounded the house While

p.57, L.1).

arrested Rebo, albeit pursuant to a warrant rather than based

circumstances.

The

Rebo’s coin pocket would have been inevitably discovered by lawful

means even if the ofﬁcers had done

it

ﬂ, 467 U.S.

would have

methamphetamine need not be suppressed

inevitably been

discovered by lawful means, the

as fruit 0f the poisonous tree.

20

as to dissipate

In sum,

Rebo lacked Fourth Amendment standing. He had neither a reasonable expectation

0f privacy in the house nor any property-based Fourth Amendment right against his seizure in the

home by

Virtue 0f the

n0 contact order Which proscribed

his presence there.

Furthermore, the

ofﬁcer did not Violate Rebo’s Fourth Amendment rights because the warrantless entry was justiﬁed

by probable cause and exigent circumstances.
suppressed as

fruit

Alternatively, the

0f the poisonous tree because

alleged police misconduct, and

it

its

would have been

discovery was sufﬁciently attenuated from the

inevitably discovered

application 0f constitutional principles t0 the facts as found

has failed to show that the

district court erred in

methamphetamine need not be

by the

by lawful means. Proper

district court reveals that

Rebo

denying his motion t0 suppress.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Rebo’s motion

Court afﬁrm the order of the

t0 suppress.

DATED this 3 lst day of March, 2020.

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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district court

denying
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